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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Over the last decade many districts have implemented performance pay incentives to reward 
teachers for improving student test scores.  Economic theory suggests that these programs could 
alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention.  Because teachers can choose to work in a 
performance pay district that has characteristics correlated with teacher behavior, I use the 
distance between a teacher’s undergraduate institution and the nearest performance pay district 
as an instrumental variable.  Using data from the 2003 and 2007 waves of the Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS), I find that teachers respond to performance pay incentives by working 
fewer hours per week at school.  Performance pay also decreases participation in unpaid 
cooperative school activities, while there is suggestive evidence that teacher turnover decreases.  
The treatment effects are heterogeneous; male teachers respond more positively to performance 
pay than female teachers.  In Florida, which restricts state performance pay funding to individual 
teachers or teams, I find that work effort and teacher turnover increase.  
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1 Introduction 
Since 1990 the nation’s high school student test scores have shown no improvement on 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) long-term trend assessments.  During 
this same time period, education expenditures per student increased from $7,500 to over $10,000 
in 2007 dollars.
1
  By 2007, ten percent of school districts had tried to jump start test score gains 
by explicitly linking a portion of teacher compensation to student performance.  These 
performance pay programs often provide a financial incentive in the form of a cash bonus or 
salary increase whenever student test scores achieve particular metrics.  The explicit chain of 
events is that these programs affect teacher behavior, which in turn, affects student academic 
performance.  The empirical evidence of performance pay’s downstream effect on student 
performance is inconclusive.  Some studies show a positive effect (Vigdor, 2009; Figlio and 
Kenny, 2007; Lavy, 2002), some studies show a negative effect (Eberts et al., 2002), and some 
studies show little or no effect at all (Fryer, 2011; Springer et al., 2010).  In order for 
performance pay programs to affect student outcomes, there must be an upstream relationship 
between incentives and teacher behavior.  This research looks inside the “black box” of 
performance pay programs and investigates the first-order effects on teacher behavior. 
Proponents of performance pay argue that an effective incentive structure rewards 
teachers for their hard work and impact on student achievement.  A few empirical studies have 
shown that teachers respond to these incentives by altering their work effort under performance 
pay.  Ahn (2011) found that teachers have fewer absences from work when the bonus outcome is 
in doubt but no change in absences when there is either a low or high probability of receiving the 
bonus.  In his evaluation of a Kenyan program that rewarded school teachers whose students 
                                                     
1
 Expenditure data is obtained from the Common Core of Data (CCD) at the National Center for Education Statistics 
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achieved higher test scores, Glewwe (2010) reported that there was no increase in teacher 
absences or homework assignments.  He found that the pedagogy did not change, although there 
was evidence that teachers conducted more test preparation sessions.  In a performance pay 
program in Israel, Lavy (2009) found that teachers increase after-school teaching and change 
their teaching methods.  Fryer (2011) found no effect of performance pay incentives on teacher 
absences or retention in New York City.   
Opponents of performance pay argue that it discourages cooperation and encourages 
teachers to “teach to the test.”  A leader of the United Teachers Los Angeles union wrote 
“teacher unions have historically resisted performance pay proposals because they undermine 
one of the core principles of teaching and learning: collaboration...as teachers we understand 
teaching is about working together to help our students, not competition for better pay.” 2  
Although few, if any, studies specifically examine teacher cooperation under performance pay, 
Jacob and Levitt (2003) found that teachers responded to high-stakes testing in Chicago public 
schools by altering student test scores.  Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) found strong 
improvements in student test scores at the middle of the achievement distribution, but little 
changes at the ends of the distribution after the introduction of No Child Left Behind standards in 
Chicago.  These findings suggest that teachers respond strategically to incentives, warranting a 
closer examination of cooperative behavior under performance pay.   
This research investigates the impact of performance pay on teacher effort, cooperation, 
and retention.  In particular, how do teacher work hours respond to performance pay incentives?  
I investigate how the composition of work hours changes in addition to the overall level of work 
hours.  I also explore if teachers respond by participating in fewer cooperative activities outside 
of the classroom.  Such an unintended consequence of performance pay may partially explain the 
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mixed evidence on student performance.  In addition, I examine whether performance pay is 
effective in retaining more teachers in the profession, a claim often made by proponents of the 
programs.  I consider whether awards that incorporate school-level performance produce a 
different response along these dimensions compared to individual awards based solely on that 
teacher’s performance in a classroom. 
To answer these research questions, I use restricted-use data from the 2003 and 2007 
waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS).  The SASS is conducted by the Department 
of Education every few years and surveys a stratified random sample of teachers who provide 
information on their background, compensation, attitudes, school activities, and teaching 
methods.  For example, teachers are asked how many hours they work in a week, if they serve on 
school committees or sponsor student organizations, and how they feel about the level of 
cooperation among the school staff.  I also incorporate school district characteristics from the 
Department of Education’s Common Core of Data (CCD) and Education Week's District 
Graduation Rate Map Tool. 
Because a teacher’s decision to work in a performance pay district is not exogenous, I use 
an instrumental variable approach to generate an unbiased estimate of teacher behavior.  The 
instrument is the distance between the teacher's undergraduate institution and the nearest 
performance pay district.  Data for new teachers suggests that many first jobs are within a close 
proximity to their undergraduate institution.  We would expect to see this relationship for a 
variety of reasons such as the fact that moving a long distance can impose significant social costs 
for many graduates.  The location pattern should mean that graduates who graduated far from a 
performance pay district are significantly less likely to teach in one.  There is no data to suggest 
that potential teachers as high school students select undergraduate institutions based on their 
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proximity to a merit pay district so the instrument should provide exogenous variation in the 
availability of merit pay districts.  In the methodology section, I provide evidence to suggest that 
the exclusion restriction for the instrument is satisfied.  For example, if high school seniors make 
their college choice at least partly in order to be closer to a performance pay district, the 
estimates would be biased.  However, data from the 2003-2004 Beginning Postsecondary 
Students Longitudinal Study shows that less than half of Education majors in their third year 
even had Education as a major when they entered college, suggesting that most high school 
students are not choosing a university to be close to a performance pay district.   
Virtually all districts reward a portion of performance pay based on school performance.  
In contrast, Florida prohibits its funding from being distributed based on school performance.  
Therefore, I analyze Florida separately from the rest of the states.  Outside of Florida, I find that 
performance pay affects teacher behavior in several ways.  Teachers respond by working twelve 
percent fewer hours per week and spending more time pursuing job opportunities outside of 
teaching.  Participation in unpaid cooperative activities decreases although the participation rate 
in paid cooperative activities remains unchanged.  There is suggestive evidence that teacher 
turnover also decreases under performance pay.   However, the response to performance pay is 
not homogeneous.  Male teachers show no significant decline in work hours while female 
teachers participate less frequently in unpaid cooperative activities.  Experienced teachers 
respond with lower work effort compared to new teachers, possibly suggesting the presence of 
peer effects.  In Florida, I find that individual-level incentives appear to increase teacher effort 
and turnover.  
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2 Background on Performance Pay 
2.1 Overview of Performance Pay Programs 
The most common form of teacher compensation today, the single salary schedule, was 
first introduced in 1921 in Denver and Des Moines school districts (Sharpes, 1987).  Under this 
pay schedule, teachers with the same level of education and teaching experience receive the 
same amount of pay.
3
  This form became the standard by the 1950s and remained relatively 
stable until the release of “A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform” by the 
National Commission on Excellence in Education in 1983.  This report highlighted several areas 
of failure in the American education system.  Partly in response, education reformers proposed 
alternative methods of teacher compensation that can be classified into two groups: skill-based 
pay and performance pay (Podgursky and Springer, 2007).  Skill-based pay is distributed to an 
individual teacher for acquiring new skills or certification.  This method of compensation 
presumes that there is a link between acquiring these skills and student outcomes.  However, 
there is little evidence to suggest this link exists (Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger, 2008; Chingos and 
Peterson, 2011; Hanushek and Rivken, 2004).  Under performance pay, teachers are typically 
rewarded based on student performance on standardized tests.  These rewards can be distributed 
at the school level, where every teacher in a high performing school receives the same award, or 
they can be rewarded at the individual level.  Although performance pay programs were 
infrequently employed in the 1980s and 1990s, rapid expansion at the district and state level 
occurred in the 2000s.   
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 Prior to the single salary schedule, female teachers were frequently victims of gender discrimination by receiving 
lower compensation than male teachers.  In Boston, compensation for male grammar school teachers in 1876 varied 
between $1700 and $3200 while female grammar school teachers only earned between $600 and $1200 (Protsik, 
1995).  The introduction of a single salary schedule was partly a response to increasing social pressure to correct pay 
inequality between male and female teachers.  By 1950, 97 percent of schools implemented the single salary 
schedule (Sharpes, 1987).  
 
7 
 
For example, in 2006 the Texas legislature allocated $100 million for Texas Educator 
Excellence Grants (TEEG).  Schools that either achieved Exemplary or Recognized performance 
ratings or were in the top quartile on the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) 
exam were eligible for up to $295,000 per year.  However, schools must also be in the top half of 
economically disadvantaged student enrollment in order to be eligible.  In 2007, Florida 
introduced the Merit Award Program (MAP) plan as a replacement for the Special Teachers Are 
Rewarded (STAR) plan just introduced in the previous year.  Since MAP was implemented at the 
district level, the details of the program vary by district.  However, at least sixty percent of a 
teacher's bonus must be based on student performance, and the award must be distributed to 
individual teachers or teaching teams.  The state of Florida set aside almost $150 million to fund 
these awards.  The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) within the US Department of Education was 
created to support projects that implement performance-based compensation systems.  In 2010, 
$442 million dollars was awarded to 62 programs in 27 states.    
Despite these recent advances and support for performance pay among the public, 
performance pay is still relatively rare.  According to data from the Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS), in 2007 only 10 percent of school districts indicated that they used financial incentives 
to reward excellence in teaching, up from 8 percent in 2003.  Figure 1 shows that there were 17 
states where more than 10 percent of school districts within the state implemented performance 
pay.  Figure 1 also shows that performance pay tends to cluster in particular regions of the 
country, namely near the southern and eastern borders.  Within any given state, there is a large 
disparity in the prevalence of performance pay.  For example, 49 percent of Florida districts 
indicated that they used performance pay, the highest in the nation; whereas Rhode Island did not 
have a single performance pay district.   
8 
 
Opposition from teacher unions may be one reason why performance pay has only slowly 
been adopted.  The National Education Association (NEA), the largest labor union in the United 
States, issued resolution F-9 that says “the Association further believes that performance pay 
schedules, such as merit pay or any other system of compensation based on an evaluation of an 
education employee’s performance, are inappropriate.4  Resolution F-10 states “any additional 
compensation beyond a single salary schedule must not be based on education employee 
evaluation, student performance, or attendance.”  This opposition has shown to be somewhat 
successful with only 64% of teachers belonging to a union in a performance pay district, 
compared with 79% of teachers belonging to a union in a non performance pay district.  
Despite opposition from the NEA, public support for performance pay is high.  In the 
2010 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll of the Public’s Attitude Toward the Public Schools, 75% of 
public school parents felt that a teacher’s salary should be very closely tied or somewhat closely 
tied to students’ academic achievement.   Kathy Christie, the Chief of Staff at the Education 
Commission of the States (ECS), an interstate organization of state policymakers explains the 
support for these programs as - "that is the type of component [performance pay] that really, 
really resonates with the public. If you are not pulling your weight, if you are not getting 
performance, if you are not tenacious and really trying to learn and all those sorts of things you 
want to see teachers doing, then you don't move up at all."     
2.2 Potential Responses to Performance Pay 
Given the differing reduced-form findings concerning the impact of performance pay on 
test scores, it is logical to step back and ask whether performance pay has any effects on teacher 
behavior.  While the previously cited studies have found either no effect or an increase in teacher 
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effort, there may be several reasons why teacher effort could actually decrease.  First, 
performance pay incentives may have heterogeneous treatment effects across gender or other 
groups.  Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that in experimental situations, men have a 
stronger preference for performance or tournament-style pay incentives compared to women.  
Given a choice between tournament pay and piece-rate pay, men were more than twice as likely 
as women to select tournament pay, although they were no more skilled at the tasks than women.  
Nevertheless, the authors find that women perform just as well as men when forced to compete 
in a tournament.  If this preference for competition holds true outside of an experimental setting, 
the decline in effort may be driven by female teachers.  New teachers may also respond 
differently to performance pay compared to more experienced teachers.   
According to the SASS survey, the average teacher in a performance pay district receives 
a financial bonus of at most $614.
5
  If improvement in student test scores is not easy or 
guaranteed, teachers may decide to reallocate their time to activities where the financial reward 
is higher.  For example, they may decide to earn a guaranteed wage outside of the school system 
rather than invest extra time in after school teaching sessions.  However, how does this 
explanation fit the data if teachers had the option of working as a tutor or outside the school 
system prior to performance pay incentives?  Psychologists explain such a phenomenon as the 
extrinsic motivation (financial reward) displacing the intrinsic motivation (internal desire to 
teach children).  In Lepper and Green (1973), the authors conducted a study with children where 
they found that subjects who were offered an extrinsic award showed less interest in a coloring 
activity than subjects who received no award.  Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) provided additional 
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 The SASS asks teachers the following question – “During the current school year, have you earned income from 
any other sources from this school system, such as a merit pay bonus, state supplement, etc.?”  The $614  award 
ceiling comes from the answer to this question.  Unfortunately, the performance pay incentive amount cannot be 
separated from the other bonuses.  In non performance pay districts, the answer to this question was $256.  A 
difference of $358 between the two figures provides a reasonable estimate for the award amount that an average 
teacher receives in a merit pay district. 
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evidence of this phenomenon when they found that Israeli children who were not paid any 
money collected more charitable donations than the group of children who were offered financial 
compensation.  To a teacher, the introduction of performance pay may also increase the saliency 
of compensation.  If a teacher’s awareness of compensation for student test scores increases, a 
teacher may decide she is better off reallocating her time elsewhere.  Chetty et al. (2009) found 
that when tax-inclusive prices were posted in a grocery store, demand for those products 
decreased even though consumers were already aware that they must pay taxes.  
When financial awards are distributed at the school level rather than to individuals, then 
teachers have an incentive to free ride on the efforts of high ability teachers.  According to data 
from the Education Commission of the States, the Teacher Incentive Fund website, and the 
National Center for Teaching Quality TR
3
 database, few, if any districts outside of the state of 
Florida, award performance pay solely on individual teacher performance.  Many of the school 
level awards are based on student performance on reading, writing and math skill assessments.  
One way to test the free riding hypothesis is to observe English and Math teachers’ response to 
performance pay.  If other teachers respond with lower effort relative to English and Math 
teachers, then free riding is a potential explanation for an overall decline in teacher work effort. 
A decline in teacher work effort could also be explained by the “happy worker is a 
productive worker” hypothesis.  Under this hypothesis, teachers who are happy at work will put 
forth more effort compared to unhappy teachers.  The SASS asks teachers several attitudinal 
questions which can be used to measure the relationship between job satisfaction and teacher 
work effort.  Because performance pay incentives are often controversial among school teachers, 
a negative environment could be created when incentives are implemented.  In a negative work 
atmosphere, teachers may decide to spend fewer hours at school.    
11 
 
 Because most performance pay districts distribute awards at the school level, this paper 
also analyzes how teacher cooperative behavior might change.  Arne Duncan, the Secretary of 
the Department of Education, gave the following remark at the National Press Club in 2010 - 
“when I was in Chicago, our teachers designed a program for performance pay and secured a $27 
million federal grant… every adult in the building…all were rewarded when the school 
improved. It builds a sense of teamwork and gives the whole school a common mission.”  Using 
the SASS, I explore whether this statement generalizes to the larger US teaching population.  I 
not only test if the perception of cooperation changes within a school, but also if actual 
cooperative behavior changes. 
Finally, within the personnel economics literature, there is empirical evidence that 
performance incentives can affect worker retention.  Lazear (2000) analyzes a large auto glass 
company that changed its compensation method from hourly wages to piece-rate pay.
6
  Lazear 
finds that the productivity increases were partly due to a retention of high output workers.  
Within education, one-third of teachers leave the profession within the first three years, and 
almost one-half leave within five years.
7
  Because performance pay incentives have been 
proposed as a way to reduce teacher attrition, I test to see if a teacher’s desire to leave the 
profession changes under performance pay 
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 Under piece-rate pay, an individual worker is paid a fixed rate for every unit produced. 
7
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3 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) 
 
Data for this project comes from the restricted-use version of the Schools and Staffing 
Survey (SASS), conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics.  Begun in 1987, the 
SASS is fielded every three to four years and surveys a stratified random sample of public 
schools, private schools, and schools funded by the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE).
8
  The 
SASS collects data on teacher, administrator, and school characteristics, as well as school 
programs and general conditions in schools.  This study uses the 2003 and 2007 waves of the 
SASS study, both of which took place after passage of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
legislation in 2001.  Prior to NCLB, each state decided whether or not to set student achievement 
standards and if these results were shared with the public.  The accountability provisions of 
NCLB required that all districts achieve Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) in Reading/Language 
Arts, Mathematics, and graduation rates.  Because of the likelihood that NCLB had a some effect 
on teacher behavior, analysis was restricted to the survey years after NCLB was passed. In 
addition to restricting the sample to public school teachers only, teachers who indicated that they 
received no salary or did not work full time were dropped from the analysis.
9
  Teachers from 
career or vocational schools, alternative schools, and special education schools were also 
removed from the sample. 
The SASS sampling frame is built from the Common Core of Data (CCD) census.  The 
CCD represents the universe of primary and secondary schools in the United States.  The SASS 
samples a school first, and then each school is linked to the district in which it is located.  The 
district for that school is also sent a questionnaire.  On average, 5 teachers were sampled for each 
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 The sample is a stratified probability-proportionate-to-size sample, stratified by state, grade range, and school type. 
9
 Individuals without a salary were likely in the dataset due to the collection methodology of the SASS.  In the 
survey year, a package containing explanatory information was mailed to sampled schools.  The school coordinator 
listed all of the teachers in the school and a subset of teachers was subsequently mailed a questionnaire.  If the 
coordinator listed volunteers who worked in the school, these would have been included in the original sample.   
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school with the range being 1 to 28.  Because the SASS does not represent the entire universe, 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 compare characteristics of the 2007 SASS districts to those districts 
not in the SASS but in the CCD.  We can reject the null that the means in the SASS districts are 
the same as non-SASS districts for three of six variables but the relative difference in the two 
sets of means is rather small.  The SASS districts have slightly lower graduation rates and 
income per capita, but nearly identical student-teacher ratios and percentage in urban areas.  A 
comparison of characteristics between SASS and non-SASS districts suggests that districts in the 
SASS are largely representative of the overall population. 
In the bottom half of Table 1, I report descriptive characteristics of teachers in the SASS.  
Almost 15 percent of teachers work in a performance pay district.  The average award among 
those that receive a pay for performance bonus is approximately $2,000.  However, only 30% of 
teachers in a performance pay district actually receive an award, substantially lowering the 
additional amount an average teacher could expect to earn.  Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 report the 
differences in districts with performance pay compared to districts without performance pay.  
Teachers in a performance pay district are less likely to be white, less likely to have a master's 
degree, less likely to be in a union, have less teaching experience, and also earn a lower salary.  
Forty-seven percent of performance pay districts are located in an urban area compared to only 
32 percent of non-performance pay districts.  Data from Education Week's District Graduation 
Rate Map Tool and from the Common Core of Data (CCD) reveal that performance pay districts 
also have a higher percentage of students living below the poverty line, have lower expenditures 
per student, and graduate fewer students from high school.
10
  Although these characteristics can 
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 I use graduation rate data from Education Week.  Rates are calculated in the following way - 
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be accounted for in a regression equation, I am concerned about unobservable characteristics that 
may attract certain types of teachers to a particular district, resulting in a biased estimate of the 
effect of performance pay.  I address this concern in more detail in the Identification section of 
the paper. 
In addition to expenditures and graduation rates playing an important role in the decision 
to implement performance pay, the interaction of the two variables may also drive that decision.  
E.g. political and parental pressure could be stronger on district officials where expenditures are 
high and graduation rates are low.  Using district's expenditures and graduation rates four years 
prior to implementation, I code each district as having either above average or below average 
graduation rates and above average or below average expenditures per student.  I identify the 
four possible combinations as: High Maintenance District (above average expenditures and 
above average graduation rates), Low Maintenance District (below average expenditures and 
below average graduation rates), Overachieving District (below average expenditures and above 
average graduation rates), and Underachieving District (above average expenditures and below 
average graduation rates).     
The primary outcome of interest, teacher effort, is measured by the total amount of hours 
spent on all teaching and school-related activities during a typical full week.  On average, 
teachers report that they work 53 hours a week, with teachers in a performance pay district 
working about half-an-hour a week longer than their counterparts.  In addition to measuring the 
impact of performance pay on total working hours, the SASS allows one to investigate the shift 
in teaching hours on specific subjects.  If teacher bonuses are based on student performances in 
particular subjects, then teachers may reallocate more of their time to these subjects.  The SASS 
also asks teachers if they spent any time in the previous 12 months on professional development 
15 
 
activities (PD) related to the content of the subjects they teach.  Almost every teacher already 
participates in some form of professional development.  The few teachers who are not currently 
involved in PD but are eligible for a bonus may pursue additional training to improve their 
ability to teach the subject material to students.   
The SASS contains several possible measures of cooperation.  Using a four point scale, 
teachers are asked to what extent they agree or disagree with the statement “There is a great deal 
of cooperative effort among the staff members.”  As the numbers in the bottom of Table 1 
indicate, forty percent of teachers indicate that they strongly agree with this statement with no 
significant differences between performance pay and non-performance pay districts.  In addition 
to this question, teachers are asked if they participate in any of the following activities: serve as a 
department chair, serve as a lead curriculum specialist, or serve on a school-wide committee.  I 
interpret increased participation in any of these activities as indicative of increased cooperation 
in the workplace because these are typically unpaid activities within a school.  About 60 percent 
of teachers participate in some form of unpaid cooperative activity in a school, although this 
number is about 5 percentage points lower for teachers in a performance pay district.  I 
separately examine how teachers participate in activities which are often paid, such as 
sponsoring a student club or coaching a sport.  To address teacher retention, I look at responses 
to the SASS question which asks teachers how long they plan to remain in teaching.  About 6 
percent of teachers indicate that they definitely plan to leave teaching as soon as they can or that 
they will leave when a more desirable job opportunity comes along; and performance pay 
teachers are significantly more likely to give this response compared to non-performance pay 
teachers. 
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4 Empirical Model 
4.1 OLS 
In addition to individual characteristics influencing teacher behavior, the school and 
district where the teacher works can also significantly affect behavior.
11
  Because teacher 
behavior can depend on characteristics of the individual, the school, and the district, the 
estimating equation is written as follows –  
 
Yisdt = β0+PerformancePaydt β1+Iisdt β2+Ssdt β3+Ddt β4+vt+ε1isdt      (1) 
 
where Y is one of several measures of teacher behavior for individual i, in school s, in district d, 
at time t.   The covariate of interest is the dummy variable PerformancePaydt which equals 1 for 
respondents that answer yes to the question  - “Does this district currently use any pay incentives 
such as cash bonuses, salary increases, or different steps on the salary schedule to reward 
excellence in teaching?”  The vector I measures characteristics of the individual and includes the 
covariates: race, gender, age, age
2
, experience, experience
2
, master's degree, and union status.  
The vector S measures school characteristics and includes covariates that measure whether it is 
an elementary school, the percent of students on free lunch, school size, and the student-teacher 
ratio.  The vector D measures district covariates including: collective bargaining, free lunch 
percentage, urban, number of schools, expenditures, graduation rates, district categorization, and 
other pay incentives.
12
  Controlling for other types of pay incentives is necessary in order to 
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 For example, Mont and Rees (2007) found that increasing class sizes are associated with higher teacher turnover.  
Gritz and Theobold (1996) found that the environment created by high levels of central office spending in a district 
will increase the likelihood that a teacher leaves the district. 
12
 District categorization variables include: High Maintenance District, Low Maintenance District, Overachieving 
District, or Underachieving District.   
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isolate the effect of performance pay.  In addition to asking districts about performance pay, the 
SASS asks districts if they use pay incentives for any of the following: teacher certification, 
recruitment or retention in a less desirable location, recruitment or retention in a field of 
shortage, signing bonus, relocation assistance, and student loan forgiveness.  The variable vt is a 
time effect and ε1isdt  is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS estimate of equation 1, excluding data from 
Florida.  Table 2 reveals several important relationships about the nature of teacher work effort.  
For every five years of experience, teachers work one hour less per week.  For each percentage 
point increase in the percentage of students receiving a free lunch from the school, a teacher 
works 3/4 of an hour less per week.  Female teachers, teachers in an elementary school, and 
teachers under a collective bargaining agreement all work fewer hours compared to their 
respective counterparts.  Even after a substantial number of variables are added to the model, the 
R
2
 is only 0.027, suggesting that it may be difficult to predict a teacher’s work hours based on 
observable characteristics.  
4.2 Identification Strategy 
OLS estimates of equation 1 are likely to be subject to an omitted variables bias.  E.g. if 
harder-working teachers are attracted to performance pay districts, then the OLS estimate would 
be positively biased.  Jones (2011) found that performance pay creates a selection effect by 
attracting teachers from universities with SAT scores 15 – 30 points higher compared to teachers 
in non-performance pay districts.  Because of endogeneity concerns with the OLS estimate, one 
way to plausibly estimate the effect of performance pay is to use an instrumental variable to 
identify exogenous variation in performance pay.   
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In a January 2010 survey by CareerBuilder.com, 80 percent of recent graduates indicated 
that they preferred their first job to be within fifty miles of either where they went to school or 
their permanent address.  Moving a long distance can impose significant social costs for many 
graduates.  These students have made significant investments in relationships with friends and 
family during the time they were in college.  Even if a teacher wants to work in a performance 
pay district, she is unlikely to work there if none are located near the university.  Moving too far 
away from the university might weaken many of the relationships formed during college.  In 
fact, the median teacher is only 64 miles from where she received her undergraduate degree.  The 
instrument for PerformancePay then is the distance, in miles, between the undergraduate 
institution and the nearest performance pay district.     
The restricted-use SASS contains the university where the teacher obtained her 
undergraduate degree.  By using the IPEDS ID for each university, I look up the address of the 
university.  The SASS also contains the address for each district.  To calculate the distance 
between these two locations, I wrote a computer program to call Yahoo's Geocoding API to 
return the longitude and latitude of each address.  Then, I calculate the distance, in miles, 
between the university and every district in the dataset and return the shortest distance to a 
performance pay district.
13
 
In order to use distance from an undergraduate institution to the nearest performance pay 
district as an instrumental variable, several conditions must be satisfied.  First, the instrument 
must cause variation in the endogenous variable, PerformancePay.  That is, the distance from a 
university to a performance pay district affects the probability of teaching in a performance pay 
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 The distance between the geographic coordinates of the two points is calculated using great circle distance.  A 
great circle contains a diameter of the sphere and is the shortest path between any two points on a sphere.  Given two 
points, located at latitude and longitude (δ1, λ1) and (δ2, λ2), on a sphere of radius α, the great circle distance is 
calculated as d = αcos-1[cos δ1cos δ2 cos (λ1 - λ2)+sin δ1sin δ2].  For more details, see Wolfram’s Mathworld entry on 
great circle distance. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GreatCircle.html. 
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district.  We can verify that this property is satisfied by estimating the following first-stage 
equation 
 
PerformancePayisdt = π0+ DistancePPisdt π1+ Iisdt π2+ Ssdt π3+ Ddt π4+ vt+ε2isdt      (2) 
 
where DistancePP is the distance, in miles, to the nearest performance pay district from a 
teacher's undergraduate university.  All other variables are the same as equation 1.  Table 3 
presents the results from equation 2.  Increasing the distance from a university to a performance 
pay district by 10 miles results in a .15 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a teacher 
works in a performance pay district.  An F Statistic of over 20 confirms that the first condition is 
satisfied and finite sample bias issues are not a concern. 
Next, the second criterion is that the distance instrument cannot be correlated with the 
error term in equation 1.  If either of the following situations is true, then the exclusion 
restriction is violated: 1) high school seniors choose a university or the teaching profession 
because of proximity to a performance pay district, or 2) districts choose to implement 
performance pay because of their proximity to universities.  Although the exclusion restriction 
cannot be proven to be satisfied, there is evidence that is consistent with the exclusion restriction.   
If high school seniors make their college choice at least partly in order to be closer to a 
performance pay district, they would need to know that they were going to be teachers when they 
graduated from high school.  Data from the 2003-2004 Beginning Postsecondary Students 
Longitudinal Study show that less than half of Education majors in their third year of college had 
Education as a major when they entered college.  Second, if few high school seniors choose to 
become a teacher for financial reasons, and performance pay is an element of compensation, then 
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it is unlikely that high school seniors choose a university to be closer to a performance pay 
district.  In his book, A Place Called School, John Goodlad wrote that 70 percent of teachers 
primarily chose to be a teacher because they enjoyed teaching or working with children.   
A district’s implementation of performance pay is also not random.  For example, the 
state of Texas explored performance pay after the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the education 
financing system was unconstitutional because of an over-reliance on local property taxes.
14
  
During a special legislative session, state leaders argued how state resources could best improve 
student outcomes.  The Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) incentive program 
emerged out of these discussions.  Adding district expenditures, district graduation rates, and 
district categorization to the regression equation directly controls for characteristics that may 
drive both performance pay adoption and teacher behavior.  These covariates also control for the 
situation where teacher labor supply responds to these same characteristics that predict 
performance pay.   
In Table A1, I report the difference in means of observed characteristics for teachers in 
the SASS for those teachers currently less than 18 miles from their undergraduate institution to 
those who are more than 18 miles from their undergraduate institution (18 miles is the median 
distance between a university and the nearest performance pay district).  If selection on the 
observables into districts close to universities is not very different between the two groups then it 
suggests that selection on the unobservables may not be very different.  In other words, I provide 
evidence that teachers farther from a performance pay district would not work longer or 
cooperate differently, prior to being in a performance pay program, compared with teachers near 
to a performance pay district.  While many of the variables between the two distance groups are 
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 Center for Educator Compensation Reform (CECR) - 
http://cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/TexasCaseSummary.pdf 
21 
 
statistically significant, few, if any, of the observable characteristics are economically 
significant.  For example, 90 percent of teachers who are located far from a performance pay 
district say that they are well prepared in classroom management techniques compared to only 89 
percent of teachers who are close to a performance pay district.  Although this is a statistically 
significant result, it is hard to imagine that such a result would lead to meaningful differences in 
teacher work hours. Finally, I check to see if the instrumental variable acts monotonically in 
order to interpret my IV estimate as a local average treatment effect (LATE).  Table A2 shows 
that the probability of a teacher working in a performance pay district is a monotonic decreasing 
function of the distance to the nearest performance pay district.   
 
5 IV Results 
5.1 Teacher Effort, Cooperation, and Retention 
Table 4 shows the effect of performance pay on teacher work hours in all states except 
Florida estimated from the IV models.  Column 1 presents results without including controls for 
district pay incentives, district graduation rates, or district expenditures.  Column 2 demonstrates 
the importance of including controls for other pay incentives that a district can employ to attract 
and retain teachers; and column 3 presents estimates with student graduation rates and district 
expenditures as controls.  The interactions of these two terms, i.e. district categorization controls, 
are included in column 4 to account for the non-randomness of a district’s decision to use 
performance pay.  Column 5 shows that teacher work hours decline by over four hours when 
university state fixed effects are included, although this result is not statistically significant.  The 
fourth column, the preferred specification, shows that the enactment of performance pay 
decreases the number of weekly work hours for all teachers by a statistically significant 6.35 
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hours.  With teachers working 53 hours a week, performance pay causes a decline in work hours 
of twelve percent.   
Figure 2 shows a chart where each of the 50 data points represents a simulation with one 
dropped state from the SASS dataset.  I perform this simulation to determine if any particular 
state was driving the decline in work hours due to performance pay.  The plot shows that 
teachers’ response to performance pay in Florida is unique compared with the other states.  
Because Florida is unique in that no other state restricts performance pay incentives to individual 
teachers, I separately analyze the effects in Florida in section 5.3.     
Table 5 presents IV estimates of the Performance Pay variable for different measures of 
work effort and for various subgroups.  Each cell in Table 5 is a separate equation where the rows 
define the dependent variables and the columns define the subgroup.  Column 3 in Table 5 shows 
that the decline in work hours is most pronounced among female teachers.  Female work hours 
drop by a statistically significant 7.12 hours, but male work hours decline by 2.93 hours, a 
statistically insignificant estimate.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 show that teachers with 4 or more 
years of experience respond negatively to performance pay.  Under performance pay, 
experienced teachers work seven hours less per week while teachers with less than 4 years of 
experience report a decline of less than half that amount.   
The decline in work hours may be a concern to proponents of performance pay, 
particularly if the amount of teaching hours declines.  However, row 2 in Table 5 shows that the 
average elementary teacher does not spend fewer hours teaching students subject material when 
performance pay is introduced.  The SASS asks elementary teachers to document how many 
hours they spend on the following subjects: English, Math, Social Studies, and Science.  Of the 
more than 50 hours that teachers spend on all school-related activities, they spend only 20 hours 
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teaching these subjects.  Since many performance pay bonuses are based on student test scores in 
Math and English subjects, I investigate if teachers in performance pay districts “teach to the 
tests.”  Row 3 in Table 5 shows that the allocation of the hours between teaching Math / English 
and other subjects does not significantly change.   
The SASS asks teachers the following question – “In the past 12 months, have you 
participated in any professional development activities specific to and concentrating on the 
content of the subject(s) you teach?”  If teachers have the possibility of earning additional pay 
based on student test scores, then teachers may have an incentive to pursue professional 
development that enables them to become better teachers.  Row 4 in Table 5 shows evidence that 
teachers actually increase their pursuit of professional development activities once performance 
pay is introduced.   
The SASS also asks if teachers earn any additional compensation during the school year.  
Such a job can come from the school system itself or from outside the school system.  For 
example, inside the school system, teachers can earn additional compensation by tutoring or 
coaching a sport.  Under performance pay, teachers are significantly more likely to take on an 
additional job outside of their teaching responsibilities.  Since the average teacher receives a 
performance pay award of at most $614, teachers may feel that their time is more valuable 
working for a guaranteed wage than receiving a performance pay award.   
Table 6 provides evidence for the happy worker / productive worker hypothesis.  Teachers 
are asked if they strongly agree with the following statements “The stress and disappointments 
involved in teaching at this school aren't really worth it” and “I don't seem to have as much 
enthusiasm now as I did when I began teaching.”  Rows 1 and 2 in Table 6 show that stress levels 
increase and enthusiasm decreases with performance pay.  If an award is distributed to every 
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teacher in an eligible school, proponents of performance pay argue that cooperation should not 
decrease.  The SASS contains a question to determine if this hypothesis is correct.  Teachers are 
asked if they strongly agree with the following statement – “There is a great deal of cooperative 
effort among the staff members.”  From row 3 of Table 6, it appears that performance pay has a 
positive effect on cooperation.  However, by only using a four point scale, this question is a 
rough approximation to measuring cooperation.   
The SASS contains several other potential measures of cooperation.  Teachers are asked 
if they participated in any of the following activities during the school year - (1) Serve as a 
department lead or chair? (2) Serve as a lead curriculum specialist? or (3) Serve on a school-wide 
or district-wide committee or task force?  Row 5 in Table 6 shows a significant decline in 
participation in these typically unpaid activities.  The differential response among men and 
women is striking; women are 42 percentage points less likely to participate in these unpaid 
cooperative activities while men show no decline in participation.  The finding that females are 
much less likely to participate in these cooperative activities after performance pay is introduced 
may explain some of the decline in female teachers’ work hours.  More experienced teachers also 
show a significant decline in unpaid cooperative activity participation.  For paid cooperative 
activities, there is no significant decline in participation among all teachers.
15
 
One-third of teachers leave the profession within the first three years, and almost one-half 
leave within five years.  Teacher attrition can be costly since hiring new teachers to replace the 
ones who left can involve recruitment and training costs.  There is also some evidence to suggest 
that inexperienced teachers can be less effective (Rockoff, 2004).  Students in high-turnover 
schools continue to be exposed to new and inexperienced teachers.  Some policy makers have 
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 Paid cooperative activities include coaching a sport and sponsoring a school club. 
25 
 
advocated that performance pay can act as a retention device to keep quality teachers from 
leaving the profession.    
Hanushek et al. (2004) find that salary differentials exert a modest impact on a teacher's 
willingness to leave the school.  In addition to altering teacher effort and cooperation, 
performance pay may also affect teacher retention.  When asked “How long do you plan to 
remain in teaching?”, row 6 in Table 6 shows that performance pay teachers are significantly less 
likely to say “definitely plan to leave as soon as I can.”  In addition to the SASS, the Department 
of Education also conducts the Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) the year following the 
administration of the SASS.  The purpose of the TFS is to determine how many teachers 
remained at the same school, moved to another school, or left the profession altogether.  The 
2008 TFS was administered to a sample of teachers who completed the SASS in the previous 
year.  Using the TFS, I find that only 6 percent of teachers who leave a performance pay district 
said that performance pay played a very or extremely important role in the decision to leave.  
When teachers were asked to describe the most important reason for their decision to leave, none 
of them cited performance pay as the reason.  Because the sample consists of only 64 teachers 
however, caution is urged in interpreting this result.     
5.2 Robustness Checks 
If performance pay districts are merely synonymous with “bad” districts, then this 
presents a potential threat to the identification strategy.
16
  Under this scenario, the effect of 
performance pay on teacher behavior is not identified; rather, the research would only show that 
bad teachers are associated with bad districts.  One falsification test to provide evidence that the 
performance pay effect is truly identified is to examine the districts which implemented 
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 Bad districts could mean that teachers in the district are uncooperative or  apathetic about teaching. 
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performance pay incentives in 2007, but not in 2003.  Then, restrict the sample to 2003 and treat 
those districts as if they implemented performance pay in 2003.  If the distance instrument is 
working correctly, the estimation should show that performance pay has no significant effect on 
teacher work hours.  If the falsification test shows that performance pay causes a significant 
decline in work hours, then it suggests that the effect of performance pay is not completely 
identified.  Column 2 in Table 7 shows that performance pay has no significant effect on work 
hours under this falsification test. 
Next, if the IV estimate of performance pay is just identifying bad teachers or bad 
districts, then there should not be a differential response by teachers of different subjects.  The 
SASS asks teachers the following question – “this school year, what is your main teaching 
assignment field at this school?”  Using the responses to this question, I divide the teacher 
sample into those who teach Math or English and those who teach another subject.  I separate the 
teachers into these two groups since performance pay incentives are often rewarded based on 
student test scores in these subjects.
17
  I then estimate the effect of performance pay separately 
for these two teacher groups.  Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 show that the decline in work hours is 
driven by teachers who do not teach Math or English.  This finding suggests that the instrument 
is properly identifying the effect of performance pay incentives.  Since the performance pay 
incentives are rewarded at the school level, this finding may also suggest that other teachers are 
free-riding on the efforts of Math and English teachers.  
In addition, districts in urban areas are closer to universities and may be influenced as to 
whether or not performance pay is implemented.  To address this concern, Table 8 separates 
teachers into urban and non-urban districts and separately analyzes the effect of performance pay 
                                                     
17E.g. Alaska’s Public School Performance Incentive Program rewards teachers based on student test scores on the 
Standards Based Assessments.  These assessments measure student performance in reading, writing, and 
mathematics.      
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on work hours.  Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 show that the point estimate of the decline in 
teacher work hours within the two subgroups is consistent with the estimate for the full sample.  
Also, although controlling for district expenditures accounts for the direct effect of expenditures 
on the decision to implement performance pay, low expenditures could be symptomatic of other 
underlying problems in the district.  These problems may be influencing the decision to 
implement performance pay.  For example, teachers in performance pay districts earned a salary 
that was $2,825 less than their counterparts in non-performance pay districts.  If districts are 
using performance pay incentives simply to make their teacher salaries equivalent with those in 
other districts, then we would not expect performance pay to influence teacher behavior.  
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 8 still show a decline in teacher work hours for those in districts with 
below average expenditures and those in districts with above average expenditures.  Column 6 in 
Table 8 shows that the estimate of the decline in teacher work hours is similar to the results in 
the original IV specification after the data is log transformed.  A log transformation addresses the 
outlier observations where the nearest distance to a performance pay district is thousands of 
miles away. 
Standard errors throughout the paper are clustered at the district level since teachers 
sampled within a district are not independent observations.  One could also consider clustering at 
the state level as well since much of the variation in the presence of merit pay programs is 
generated by state action.  Furthermore, standard errors can also be calculated using replicate 
weights because the SASS is a complex survey design (i.e. samples are stratified, clustered, and 
weighted).  Replicate weights are used to generate more accurate standard error estimates by 
retaining all the information about the complex sample design.  Standard errors are calculated 
after constructing subsamples, or replicates, from the full sample.  Instead of creating replicates 
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by randomly drawing observations (as in some bootstrapping methods), the method of replicate 
weights incorporates the stratification and clustering information of the SASS.  The difference 
between the point estimate in the full sample and the point estimate using the weights of each of 
the replicates is used to determine the standard error.  The variance of a statistic, Y, is then given 
as - 
        ( )  
 
  
∑(    )
 
  
   
 
where Yr equals the estimate using the r
th
 set of replicate weights and Y is the result using the 
full-sample weight.   
Table A3 displays the estimate of performance pay on measures of work effort by 
different standard error calculations, including replicate weights.  Table A3 shows that standard 
errors increase between the OLS estimate and the IV estimate; standard errors are also higher 
when standard errors are clustered at the state level compared to the district level.  Calculations 
using replicate weights are approximate to clustering at the district level.  This finding is 
consistent with other datasets that use replicate weights, including the 2005-2009 March 
supplements of the IPUMS-CPS.  Under  IPUMS testing of CPS data, “replicate weights usually 
increase standard errors.”18  Regardless of the method for calculating standard errors, the results 
for the paper hold.  
5.3 Florida 
 One limitation of the analysis in this study is that performance pay is only defined as a 
binary variable on the question of a district using financial incentives to reward excellence in 
teaching.  Since not all performance pay programs are created identically, the effect of 
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 http://cps.ipums.org/cps/repwt.shtml 
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performance pay could vary by implementation.  Teachers may respond differently to an 
individual award compared to a school award.  The state of Florida provides an opportunity to 
specifically examine how individual-level award distribution contrasts with school-level award 
distribution.   
In 1999, the Florida state legislature passed a statute that required districts to offer a 
bonus of at least 5 percent of a teacher’s salary as a reward for outstanding individual teaching.19  
The bonus could not be based on school level metrics.  Because the state did not provide any 
additional funds for this requirement, many districts failed to implement the policy.  In 2006, the 
state began to distribute additional funds to districts which implemented a performance pay 
policy.  Table 9 provides a description of the four performance pay programs in Florida during 
the time period of the SASS dataset.  Although various details change over time, the distribution 
of the award to the individual teacher remains constant.  The 2007 Merit Award Program (MAP) 
does make an allowance for a “teaching team”; however, less than 5 percent of teachers in 
Florida are members of a teaching team.
20
   
While the individual nature of the performance pay program appears to be driving the 
result in Florida, I also evaluate the other characteristics of the Florida program relative to 
programs outside of the state.  A performance bonus in Florida must be at least 5% of a teacher’s 
salary.  At an average salary of $43,724, this requirement translates into an award of $2,186.  In 
the SASS, the average amount for a teacher that received an award in Florida was $1,966, 
consistent with the state mandate.  Within the entire SASS dataset, the average award amount 
was $2,047, suggesting that the award amount in the Florida program is not driving the result.  I 
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 Florida State Statute, Title XVI, §230.23 
20
In the SASS, these teachers affirmed the following statement – “You are one of two or more teachers, in the same 
class, at the same time, and are jointly responsible for teaching the same group of students all or most of the day 
(sometimes called Team Teaching).”  Only 4 percent of all teachers in the SASS dataset are members of a teaching 
team. 
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also check to see if the proportion of awarded teachers could be a contributing factor.  The 
proportion of teachers who received an award in a performance pay district in Florida is 40%, 
compared to 30% of teachers in the SASS dataset.  Although the proportion of rewarded teachers 
is not dramatically different, I cannot rule out that rewarding a higher proportion of teachers is a 
contributing factor to Florida’s results.   
Table 10 shows the effect of performance pay on teacher work effort, cooperation, and 
retention in Florida compared to the rest of the states.  Column 1 in Table 10 shows that teacher 
work hours increases by a remarkable 13 hours, or 25 percent, in response to performance pay in 
Florida.  Outside of Florida, the baseline results show that teacher work hours decline by more 
than 6 hours, or 12 percent.  Teachers appear to respond much differently to individual- level 
incentives compared to school-level incentives.  Although these changes in effort appear high, 
they are consistent with and even lower than other estimates in the literature.  Lazear (2000) 
finds a 44 percent increase in productivity when piece-rate compensation is introduced in an auto 
glass manufacturer.  Bandiera et al. (2005) find a twenty-one percent decrease in productivity in 
a field experiment using relative incentives.
21
  Florida teachers also report a lower participation 
rate in unpaid cooperative activities, although the result is not statistically significant.  Finally, 
teachers in Florida under performance pay are significantly more likely to say that they would 
definitely leave the profession.      
 
6 Conclusion 
Using a nationally representative dataset and a novel instrumental variable approach, I 
find that the enactment of performance pay affects teacher behavior in several ways.  Outside of 
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 Under relative incentives, if a worker is moved from a group with none of her friends present to a group with 5 or 
more of her friends present, that worker’s productivity declines by 21 percent. 
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Florida, teachers respond by working twelve percent fewer hours per week and spend more time 
pursuing other job opportunities.  Participation in unpaid cooperative activities decreases while 
participation in paid cooperative activities remains unchanged.  Teacher turnover also appears to 
significantly decrease under performance pay. 
However, the response to performance pay is not homogeneous.  Male teachers show no 
significant decline in work hours.  Female teachers participate less frequently in unpaid 
cooperative activities compared to male teachers.  Experienced teachers respond with lower 
work effort compared to new teachers, possibly suggesting the presence of peer effects.  The use 
of individual-level awards in Florida leads to an entirely different response to school-level 
awards outside of Florida.  In Florida, individual effort increased by 25 percent under 
performance pay; teachers were also much more likely to indicate that they would leave the 
profession in Florida.       
The findings in this paper lead to several future avenues of research.  The results suggest 
that there may be a selection effect for male and female teachers, but does the evidence support 
this hypothesis?  Are men more likely to join the teaching profession if they can be rewarded for 
their students' performance?  Also, how does the proportion of awards affect teacher behavior?  
If the number of awards are particularly low or high, do teachers respond differently?  These 
questions are all fruitful areas of future research. 
Policy makers can also take away several lessons from the findings in this research.  
Since teachers respond to incentives, careful consideration should be given to how performance 
pay is implemented.  Evidence from Florida indicates that individual-level incentives can lead to 
increased work effort, although a cooperative environment may be weakened.  Attention should 
also be paid to the types of teachers in a performance pay program.  A school with a higher 
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percentage of new teachers and male teachers should respond more positively.  Since new 
teachers do not respond negatively to performance pay, results from a performance pay program 
may improve over time as experienced teachers retire and new teachers take their place.   
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Figure 1: Percentage of School Districts with Performance Pay, By State, 2007 
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Figure 2: Simulation of Change in Work Hours from Performance Pay 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, All States, Data from SASS & Common Core of Data (CCD)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
All SASS 
Districts 
Non SASS 
Districts
1
 
PP Districts  
Non-PP 
Districts 
2007 District Characteristics     
     
Urban District .339 .337 .470
**
 .316 
Freshman Graduation Rate
2
 .794 .817
**
 .754 .798
**
 
Teacher-Student Ratio 14.968 14.980 16.191
**
 14.804 
Expenditures per Student $10,082 $11,167
**
 $9,463 $10,081
**
 
Income per Capita $19,351 $19,829
**
 $19,231 $19,160 
Percentage below Poverty .124
**
 .115 .143
**
 .124 
     
SASS Teacher Characteristics     
     
Age 42.176  42.201 42.175 
Experience 13.858  13.064 13.959
**
 
Male .243  .241 .242 
White .900  .831 .909
**
 
Masters Degree .481  .433 .483
**
 
Union .770  .638 .788
**
 
Salary  $49,195  $46,549 $49,374
**
 
Additional Award Received
3
 $309  $614
**4
 $256 
Work Hours 52.927  53.413
**
 52.843 
Professional Development .984  .990
**
 .983 
Perception of Cooperation
5
 .402  .392 .404 
Unpaid Cooperative Activities .607  .567 .611
**
 
Leave Teaching
6
 .062  .073
**
 .058 
     
SASS Teacher Observations 58470  7590 50890 
SASS District Observations 5910  560 5350 
**
 Mean is significantly higher at a 5% level of significance 
Financial data are in 2007 dollars 
1) Data obtained from 2007 Common Core of Data (CCD).  In 2007. there were approximately 18,000 school 
districts in the United States. 
2) The proportion of high school freshman who graduate with a regular diploma 4 years after starting 9th grade 
3) The amount comes from this question – “During the current school year, have you earned income from any other 
sources from this school system, such as a merit pay bonus, state supplement, etc.?”   
4) Conditional on having received a performance pay award, the average teacher earned an award of $2,047.  30% 
of teachers in a performance pay district indicate that they received an award. 
5) The proportion of teachers who strongly agree that there is a great deal of cooperative effort among the staff 
members. 
6) I create a dummy variable coded as 1 if teachers respond to the question “How long do you plan to remain in 
teaching?” with “Definitely plan to leave as soon as I can” or “Until a more desirable job opportunity comes along.”  
The variable is coded as 0 with any other response. 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes  
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Table 2: OLS Estimate of Performance Pay on Work Hours, Excluding Florida from SASS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Male Female New Experienced 
Performance Pay 0.171 0.134 0.180 0.150 0.178 
 (0.250) (0.545) (0.290) (0.631) (0.282) 
Black -0.059 1.451
**
 -0.507 -2.290
***
 0.469 
Hispanic -0.850
**
 -0.618 -0.953
**
 -1.095 -0.804
**
 
Other Race 0.023 0.436 -0.158 -0.086 0.131 
Male 0.491
***
 0.000 0.000 1.142
***
 0.386
**
 
Masters Degree -0.241 -0.498
*
 -0.090 0.558 -0.253 
Age 0.005 0.037 0.004 0.192 0.085 
Age
2
 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
Experience -0.198
***
 -0.112
*
 -0.263
***
 -2.720
*
 -0.105
**
 
Experience
2
 0.003
***
 0.001 0.006
***
 0.468 0.001 
Individual in Union 0.648
***
 0.719
**
 0.590
***
 0.219 0.718
***
 
Urban School 0.285 -0.272 0.451
*
 0.908
*
 0.199 
Elementary School -0.910
***
 -1.802
***
 -0.692
***
 -0.011 -1.044
***
 
Free Lunch Percentage -0.726
**
 -0.118 -0.866
**
 -0.224 -0.877
**
 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.003 -0.010
***
 0.003 0.004 -0.006 
School Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*
 
Number of District Schools -0.002
***
 -0.001 -0.003
***
 -0.002 -0.003
***
 
Collective Bargaining -0.883
***
 -1.965
***
 -0.552
***
 -0.386 -0.958
***
 
Urban District 0.218 0.025 0.305 -0.108 0.271 
2007 
 
0.133 0.068 0.162 -0.268 0.212 
Other District Incentives
1
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 47800 15180 32620 7620 40170 
R-Square 0.027 0.054 0.026 0.026 0.027 
DV Mean 52.932 53.585 52.720 54.603 52.612 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
1) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
2) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes  
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Table 3: First Stage IV Estimate, Equation 2, Excluding Florida from SASS 
 (1) 
 All  
DistancePP -0.00015
***
 
(0.00003) 
Black 0.043
*
 
Hispanic 0.028 
Other Race 0.017 
Male 0.003 
Masters Degree 0.004 
Age -0.000 
Age
2
 0.000 
Experience -0.002 
Experience
2
 0.000 
Individual in Union -0.018
*
 
Urban School 0.012 
Elementary School  -0.010 
Free Lunch Percentage -0.007 
Student-Teacher Ratio -0.000 
School Size 0.000 
Number of District Schools -0.000 
Collective Bargaining -0.061
***
 
Urban District 0.056
***
 
2007 0.030
**
 
  
Other District Incentives
1
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
First Stage F Statistic 20.52 
Observations 45220 
R-Square 0.128 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
The dependent variable is the probability that a teacher is employed in a performance pay district. 
1) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
2) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test provides additional evidence that performance pay is endogenous.  To conduct the 
DWH test, I perform a regression of equation 1 with the addition of the residuals from the IV first stage equation 
shown above.  If the coefficient on the residuals is significantly different than zero, then the OLS estimate is not 
consistent.  Because F(1,4405) = 5.19 with a p-value of 0.0228, I conclude that PerformancePay is endogenous. 
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Table 4: IV Estimate of Performance Pay on Work Hours, Excluding Florida from SASS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
Baseline 
Estimate 
 
Performance Pay -15.681
***
 
(4.970) 
-7.465
**
 
(2.7445) 
-6.108
*
 
(2.629) 
-6.348
**
 
(2.634) 
-4.290 
(3.206) 
      
Controls Included      
Other District Incentives
1
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
2
 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
University State FE No No No No Yes 
Observations 52840 50780 45220 45220 45180 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
1) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
2) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 5: IV Estimates of Performance Pay on Measures of Work Effort,                  
Excluding Florida from SASS 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Male Female New Experienced 
Work Hours -6.348
**
 -2.928 -7.124
**
 -2.818 -7.103
***
 
 (2.634) (3.511) (3.066) (4.268) (2.738) 
Teaching Hours
1
 3.140 8.127
*
 1.718 -7.237 5.159
**
 
 (2.098) (4.328) (2.047) (5.082) (2.503) 
Math and English Hours 2.683 7.221 1.696 -2.075 3.741
*
 
 (1.901) (4.992) (2.018) (5.990) (2.157) 
Professional Development 0.049
***
 0.092
*
 0.037
**
 0.055 0.052
**
 
 (0.018) (0.050) (0.017) (0.073) (0.024) 
Additional Job 0.303
*
 0.509
***
 0.214 0.207 0.318
**
 
 (0.177) (0.191) (0.220) (0.505) (0.139) 
      
Other District Incentives
2
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
3
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 45220 14400 30820 7260 37960 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
Each cell in the table is a separate estimating equation 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
Earnings are in $000s  
1) Elementary teachers were asked how many hours they spend teaching the following subjects: Math, English, 
Science, and Social Studies.  Restricting the data to elementary teachers reduces the number of observations to 
15,170. 
2) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
3) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 6: IV Estimates of Performance Pay on Job Satisfaction, Cooperation and Retention, 
Excluding Florida from SASS 
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All Male Female New Experienced 
Teacher Stress 0.232
**
 0.357
*
 0.193 0.203 0.251
**
 
 (0.109) (0.186) (0.133) (0.354) (0.107) 
Teacher Lack of Enthusiasm 0.216
**
 0.336
*
 0.179 0.203 0.231
**
 
 (0.110) (0.186) (0.135) (0.356) (0.106) 
Perception of Cooperation 0.222
**
 0.322
*
 0.188 0.197 0.238
**
 
 (0.106) (0.186) (0.133) (0.342) (0.105) 
Paid Cooperative Activities
1
 0.015 -0.172 0.068 -0.142 0.054 
 (0.099) (0.172) (0.131) (0.224) (0.105) 
Unpaid Cooperative Activities
2
 -0.262
**
 0.265 -0.416
***
 -0.151 -0.270
**
 
 (0.119) (0.236) (0.134) (0.330) (0.122) 
Leave Teaching -0.143
**
 -0.296 -0.101
**
 -0.007 -0.177
**
 
 (0.057) (0.200) (0.045) (0.111) (0.077) 
      
Other District Incentives
3
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
4
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 45220 14400 30820 7260 37960 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
Each cell in the table is a separate estimating equation 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
1) Paid cooperative activities: coach a sport, sponsor a student group, club, or organization 
2) Unpaid cooperative activities: serve as a department lead or chair, serve as a lead curriculum specialist, and serve 
on a school-wide or district-wide committee or task force 
3) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
4) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 7: Falsification Tests, IV Estimate of Performance Pay on Work Hours,        
Excluding Florida from SASS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Baseline 
Estimate 
Restrict PP 
Districts in 
2007 to 2003 
Math or 
English 
Teachers 
Non Math 
or English 
Teachers 
Performance Pay -6.348
**
 
(2.634) 
-1.988 
(2.531) 
0.762 
(3.541) 
-6.038
***
 
(2.197) 
     
Other District Incentives
1
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 45220 22400 10550 34670 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
1) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
2) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 8: Robustness Checks, IV Estimate of Performance Pay on Work Hours,     
Excluding Florida from SASS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Baseline 
Estimate 
Urban 
Non-
Urban 
Below 
Average 
Expenditures 
Above 
Average 
Expenditures 
Ln 
Distance 
Performance Pay -6.348
**
 
(2.634) 
-4.518
**
 
(2.200) 
-9.022 
(12.087) 
-6.580 
(4.262) 
-5.650
*
 
(2.931) 
-4.657
***
 
(1.553) 
       
Other District Incentives
1
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 45220 23580 21640 23400 21820 45220 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
1) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
2) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
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Table 9: Description of Florida’s Performance Pay Programs 
 State Statute E-Comp STAR MAP 
Program Basis State statute State board of 
education 
administrative 
rule 
Proviso language 
in appropriations 
bill 
State statute 
Beginning and 
End Dates 
1999-2007 March 2006-
April 2006 
April 2006 – 
March 2007  
March 2007 – 
Current 
Award Size 5% of individual 
salary 
5% of individual 
salary 
5% of individual 
salary 
5% to 10% of  
district’s  
average teacher  
salary 
Proportion of 
Teachers 
Awarded 
Not specified At least 10% At least 25% District 
discretion 
Award Criteria Identify staff 
demonstrating 
“outstanding 
performance” 
based primarily 
on improved 
student 
performance 
Student learning 
gains on state 
assessment or 
districtwide 
assessment 
At least 50% 
based on student 
learning games, 
up to 50% based 
on principal 
evaluations. 
At least 60% 
based on student 
proficiency or 
learning gains, 
up to 40% based 
on principal 
evaluations. 
Award Level Individual 
teacher 
Individual 
teacher 
Individual 
teacher 
Individual 
teacher or 
teacher team 
Measures of 
Student 
Learning 
FCAT and 
districtwide 
assessments 
FCAT and 
districtwide 
assessments 
FCAT, 
standardized 
tests, and 
districtwide 
assessments 
FCAT, 
standardized 
tests, and 
districtwide 
assessments 
Funding Districts fund 
with existing 
funding 
State department 
of education 
requested $55 
million in 
funding 
$147.5 million in 
state funding 
$147.5 million in 
state funding 
Source: http://cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/FloridaCaseSummary.pdf 
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Table 10: IV Estimates of Performance Pay on Teacher Behavior in Florida 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Only 
Florida 
All States w/out 
Florida 
Work Hours 13.285
*
 -6.348
**
 
 (7.191) (2.634) 
Unpaid Cooperative Activities -0.500 -0.262
**
 
 (0.560) (0.119) 
Leave Teaching 0.399
**
 -0.143
**
 
 (.203) (0.057) 
   
Other District Incentives
1
 
District Graduation Rate 
District Expenditures 
District Categorization
2
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 1270 45220 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by district 
Each cell in the table is a separate estimating equation 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
1) Other District Incentives: Certification, Field Shortage, Less Desirable Location, Signing Bonus, Relocation 
Assistance, Loan Forgiveness 
2) District Categorization: High Maintenance, Low Maintenance, Overachieving, Underachieving 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Selection on Observables, All States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Overall 
Mean 
University is <= 
18 miles to PP 
District 
University is > 
18 miles to PP 
District 
Difference 
Demographics     
     
Age 42.176 42.205 42.157 .049 
White .900 .886 .908
**
 -.022 
Black .079 .096
**
 .068 .028 
Male .243 .224 .256
**
 -.031 
SAT Math
1
 487.911 489.566
**
 486.492 3.074 
SAT Verbal  480.077 480.498 479.717 .781 
     
Teaching Preparation
2
     
     
Classroom Management .899 .890 .904
**
 -.014 
Instructional Methods .926 .918 .932
**
 -.014 
Subject Matter .953 .947 .956
**
 -.009 
Classroom Computers .908 .898 .915
**
 -.016 
Student Assessment .923 .911 .930
**
 -.018 
Curriculum Selection .914 .906 .912
**
 -.012 
     
Educational Background     
     
Teaching Methods Course
3
 .914 .909 .917 -.008 
Student Teaching
4
 .911 .890 .924
**
 -.034 
State Teaching Certificate
5
 .887 .877 .893
**
 -.016 
**
 Mean is significantly higher at a 5% level of significance.  While many of the variables between the two distance 
groups are statistically significant, few, if any, of the observable characteristics are economically significant. 
1) The 25
th
 percentile SAT Scores of  the incoming freshman class where the teacher obtained her undergraduate 
degree.  Data is obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), hosted by the US 
Department of Education  
2) Dummy variable equals 1 if teacher was well or very well prepared for the first year of teaching in those areas 
3) Dummy variable equals 1 if teacher took a course on teaching methods 
4) Dummy variable equals 1 if teacher student taught while earning her degree 
5) Dummy variable equals 1 if teacher has a state teaching certificate 
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Table A2: IV Monotonicity 
Distance to PP District
1
 
% of Teachers in PP 
District 
Difference from previous 
threshold 
P-Value 
0 – 20 miles .248   
20 – 40 miles .144 -.104 .000 
40 – 60 miles .116 -.028 .013 
60 – 80 miles .082 -.035 .014 
80 – 100 miles .080 -.002 .926 
1) 92% of observations are less than 100 miles 
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Table A3: Standard Error Estimates, Effect of Performance Pay on Work Hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS 
IV, No 
Clustering 
IV, District 
Clustering 
IV, State 
Clustering 
IV, Replicate 
Weights 
Work Hours 0.171 
(0.250) 
-6.348
**
 
(2.117) 
-6.348
**
 
(2.634) 
-6.281
*
 
(2.705) 
-6.348
**
 
(2.764) 
Observations 47800 45220 45220 45180 45220 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Individual, school, district, and time controls are included.  See Table 2 for further description of these controls. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Note: Sample sizes rounded to nearest 10 for NCES confidentiality purposes 
The sample sizes for column 4 are lower because I cannot identify the state for some universities.  In the SASS, I 
only know the name of the university.  The same name can be used for different colleges in different states. 
 
